Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political Campaigns by Panova, Elena
     
Panova: Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques and CIRPÉE. Phone: +1-514-771-7773 
panova.elena@uqam.ca 
 
This paper is based on the first paper of my Ph.D. dissertation. I am extremely grateful to my supervisor Jean Tirole for his 
guidance. I thank Mathias Dewatripont and Andrea Prat who made many useful comments on my work. I also benefited from 
comments by David Dreyer Lassen, Nicolas Marceau, Louis Phaneuf, Nicolas Sahuguet, Christian Shultz, Peter Norman 
Sørensen, Julia Shvetz, John Sutton, Etienne Wasmer, and seminar participants at CORE, Durham, ECARES, University of 
Exeter, University of Copenhagen, and Université du Québec à Montréal. The work was completed as I held position of a post-
doctoral fellow at CORE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 07-22 
 
 
 
 
Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political 
Campaigns 
 
 
 
Elena Panova 
 
 
 
 
Septembre/September 2007 
Abstract:  
This paper builds a theory of electoral campaign contributions. Interest groups 
contribute to political campaigns to signal their private information on the valence of  
candidates for office. Campaign contributions by an interest group enhance electoral 
fortunes by a candidate who is valent with this group. The candidate preferred by an 
interest group whose private information is the most precise receives the highest 
contributions and wins political office. Campaign contributions are smaller than donor 
electoral sorting benefits. 
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1 Introduction
Political campaign contributions play an important role in elections: (i) polit-
ical advertising is expensive, however, these expenses are much smaller than
stakes of public policies; (ii) most of campaign contributions comes from pri-
vate sources; (iii) winners of elections (mostly incumbents) receive the highest
contributions. These patterns are clearly revealed in the US Congressional
races. During the last two decades, the US Congressional candidates raised
and spent more than a billion 2003 US dollars per election cycle.1 Approxi-
mately 80% of these contributions were donated by individuals most of them
directly, and the other part through Political Action Committees.2 On av-
erage, an incumbent candidate received almost 6 times larger contributions
than a challenger candidate.3 Incumbents won more than 90% of House
races, and about 80% of Senate races.4
Given that private campaign financiers may pursue different objectives,
these observations raise the following inter-related issues: what are the incen-
tives to contribute to electoral campaigns, and why does political advertising
influence elections? Furthermore, why is it that campaign contributions are
skewed towards incumbent candidates?
1From 1981 to 2002, average US Congressional campaign fundraising per election cycle
was 1069 millions of 2003 US dollars (see data available at http://www.fec.gov, deflated
with GDP per capita deflator). This sum is roughly equal to half the annual budget of a
small state like Wyoming or Dakota. At the same time, campaign fundraising per election
cycle made up only 0.026% of Federal budget receipts in the two subsequent years.
2In order to increase transparency of corporate participation in campaign financing,
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 allowed organizations to establish Political
Action Committees (PACs) that raise donations from individuals (mostly stockholders
and managers) and give them to candidates. In the following three decades, 60% of
the Fortune 500 companies have established their PACs. However, from 1982 to 2004,
donations from individuals constituted 55% of the US Congressional campaign receipts,
while the share of contributions from PACs was only 26%.
3From 1992 to 2002 an incumbent to a challenger candidate campaign receipts ratio
was 5.67 in the House and 5.62 in the Senate.
4From 1964 to 2002, the House re-election rate reached a minimum of 85% in 1970, and
achieved a maximum of 98% in 1998 and 2000. The Senate re-election rate fell to 55% in
1980, and peaked at 96% in 1990.
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To address these issues, we build a two-period model of a representative
democracy with an election at the end of the first period. The electorate is
divided in two interest groups. Each group is a uniform constituency of voters
who benefit from group-specific public policy. There are two candidates
competing for office: the incumbent and the challenger. A candidate has
two-dimensional type: each dimension represents her valence with specific
interest group, that is, her ability to deliver policy benefits to this group.
A voter’s objectives are lexicographic: (i) it is the most important for
him to elect a candidate who is valent with his interest group; and (ii) he
would also like to elect a candidate who is not valent with the other interest
group. Voter information about the challenger’s type is diffused. Instead, a
voter holds private signal on the incumbent’s type. This signal is generated
by the voter’s benefit from the incumbent’s public policy: strength of the
signal depends on the size of the benefit.
The voters can signal their information about the incumbent’s type in two
ways: (i) through “cheap-talk” endorsements; and (ii) through campaign con-
tributions. We allow for any amount of correlation between the dimensions
of a candidate’s type, and we study bandwagon effects of endorsements and
campaign contributions.
When the correlation is weaker than the lower threshold, private informa-
tion by one interest group is irrelevant for the vote by the other interest group.
Hence, both endorsements and campaign contributions are useless. When the
correlation is stronger than the upper threshold, both interest groups would
like to vote for the same candidate depending on the most precise signal
on the incumbent’s type out of the two that they receive. Therefore, they
effectively share information through “cheap-talk” endorsements and vote
coherently afterwards.
However, when the correlation is stronger than the lower threshold, but
weaker than the upper threshold, “cheap-talk” endorsements are not convinc-
ing. The reason is that the vote by an interest group is independent, unless
it believes that the other interest group’s private signal on the incumbent’s
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type is more important than its own: then, it is brought on board by better-
informed interest group. Naturally, an interest group would always like to
claim that it holds the strongest signal on the incumbent’s type, so as to
avoid a possible tie in the election. Therefore, the voters do not believe such
claims, unless they are supported by campaign contribution that is unreason-
ably expensive if the donor’s signal is weaker than it claims. When an interest
group indeed receives information that may induce electoral bandwagon, it
burns money through campaign contributions.
Notice, that we rationalize campaign contributions without the sale of
policy favours or assuming that the voters prefer a candidate with higher
campaign spending: this is the main difference between our paper and other
models of campaign contributions. We find that campaign contributions
lie below the donor’s expected signalling benefits. This insight comports
nicely with political advertising expenditures observed to lie far below the
stakes of public policies (see Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003).
Furthermore, we find that the incumbent raises more contributions, because
the interest groups hold more information about her type than about the
challenger’s type.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews closely re-
lated literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 considers a “thought
experiment” in which the interest groups share their information about the
candidates for office. Thereby, it prepares the basis for Section 5 that de-
scribes bandwagon effects of endorsements and campaign contributions. Sec-
tion 6 discusses the impact of campaign contributions on electoral sorting.
Section 7 briefly reviews the main insights. Technical proofs are collected in
the Appendix.
2 Related literature
A sizeable literature in economics views campaign contributions as a payment
for policy favor from informed lobbies to candidates, and explicitly assumes
4
that uninformed voters are more eager to elect a candidate who raises more
contributions. These papers do not explain why politicians get away with
corruption, because they do not model the asymmetry of information that
generates a signal-extraction problem for the voters or judges.
Starting with Austen-Smith (1987), a growing number of studies point
at this drawback, and build models in which political campaigns provide
information about the quality of candidates to rational voters. Political ad-
vertising is financed by informed lobbies donating contributions to those can-
didates who bias policies towards their interests. However, in equilibrium,
candidates who run more expensive campaigns are also more suitable for the
voters. The reason depends on whether political advertising is assumed to
be directly informative or not.
Unlike us, Ashworth (2003), Coate (2003), Schultz (2003), and Wittman
(2005) assume that campaign advertising directly informs the voters about
policy platforms by candidates for office. Therefore, those candidates whose
platforms are more beneficial for the voters generate higher returns from
campaign advertising. Hence, they advertise more. Instead, Potters, Sloof,
and van Winden (1997), and Prat (1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), assume that
political advertising is not directly informative. Candidates for office must
bias their policies in order to raise campaign donations from informed lob-
bies. High campaign receipts by a candidate signal her high quality, because
lobbies have stronger incentives to give money to valent candidates.5
We rationalize political advertising much like Prat does in the series of his
papers. However, in our model there is no sale of policy favours. Candidates
for office receive donations from interest groups which care directly about
the election winner’s type, because this type determines public policy after
the election. This approach is reminiscent of Battaglini and Bénabou (2003),
who study political activism by several interest groups.
5This is reminiscent of Milgrom and Roberts (1986). However, in the context of political
(rather than commercial) advertising candidates outsource campaign finance.
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3 A model of electoral campaigns
Consider a two-period model of a representative democracy.6 At the end
of the first period there is an election in which two candidates compete for
office: the first-period incumbent and the challenger.
The electorate is divided in two interest groups: each group is a uniform
constituency of voters who benefit from group-specific public project. We
index interest groups and group-specific projects by i = 1, 2. The cost of
project i is normalized to 1. It is paid by both interest groups in equal
shares. Return ri from project i goes to interest group i.
7
Project i may generate: (i) high return, that is, ri = R; or (ii) moderate
return, that is, ri = r (where
1
2
< r < R); or else (iii) no return at all, in
which case we say that it fails. The outcome of project i depends on valence
vi by the politician in office with interest group i.
8 The higher the valence,
more weight is put on successful outcomes:
ri =


R, with probability vi,
r, with probability vi + l,
0, with probability 1− l − 2vi.
Parameter l measures “luck”. It is such that the politician in office: (i)
delivers moderate return from a project with a positive probability; and (ii)
fails a project with a positive probability, for any vi:
0 < l < 1− 2v. (1)
For simplicity, we assume that a candidate for office is either valent with
interest group i, that is vi = v; or she is nonvalent with interest group i, that
is vi = 0. Table 1 describes a candidate’s two-dimensional type (v1, v2), and
6Timing of the game is summarized at the end of this section.
7Outcome of project i is realized within a period. However, for notational convenience,
we omit period indicator for variable ri.
8We follow the political science tradition of using “valence” for “quality”: a politician’s
valence with an interest group measures her ability to deliver policy benefits to this group,
or else her congruence with the group.
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the prior distribution from which it is drawn. This distribution is common
knowledge, while a candidate’s type is her private information.
Table 1: A candidate’s type.
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v1 = v
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(prior weight ρ
2
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	
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	 usc 1
(prior weight 1−ρ
2
)
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	
 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	 usc 2
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2
)

(prior weight ρ
2
)
We say that a candidate is unbiased when her type lies on the main diagonal
of table 1, that is, v1 = v2. The prior probability of this event is equal to ρ.
Hence, parameter ρ measures the degree of congruence between the interest
groups. It is the most important parameter of the model.
In each period, the politician in office decides whether to undertake a
project or to shut it down. Notice, that in general this decision is not trivial,
because the projects are costly, and their outcomes are stochastic. We assume
that it is efficient (i) to undertake project i, if and only if the politician in
office is valent with interest group i; and (ii) to undertake both projects, if
type by the politician in office is drawn at random from the prior distribution.
These properties are guaranteed by inequalities
lr +
v
2
(r +R) > 1, and (2)
lr < 1. (3)
However, the politician in office is not benevolent. She attaches only an ar-
bitrary small value to picking efficient policies. Her primary objective is to
be in office.
For simplicity, we assume that the voters see whether a project is un-
dertaken or not, and we focus on those perfect Bayesian equilibria of the
game in which re-election concerns encourage the first-period incumbent to
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undertake both projects regardless of her type.9 Returns from the projects
generate two signals on the incumbent’s type. These signals go to different
receivers: return from project i is private information by interest group i.
The interest groups can share information during electoral campaigns in
two ways. The first way is cheap-talk endorsements: interest group i can
claim that it has received any return e(ri) ∈ {0, r, R} from project i, regard-
less of return ri that it has received in reality.
10 The second way is costly
signalling through campaign contributions: interest group i can contribute
any positive sum cI(ri) to the incumbent’s campaign or/and any positive
sum cC(ri) to the challenger’s campaign. Both endorsements and campaign
contributions are public information.
Timing of the game
Date 1.
a. Nature draws the incumbent’s type.
b. The incumbent learns her type, and she undertakes both projects.
c. A project either succeeds or fails. Interest group i receives return ri from
project i and updates its beliefs about the incumbent’s type.
d. An interest group makes public endorsements and/or campaign contribu-
tions, and the voters form their posterior beliefs about the incumbent’s type.
Date 2. The election.
The winner of the election picks public policy.
9The last section in the Appendix proves the existence of such an equilibrium.
10There are three reasons for which we assume that endorsements provide “soft” infor-
mation about candidates for office. (i) In the US, lying during electoral campaigns is legal
(unlike lying in commercial advertising). Also, direct lying can be avoided by selective
reporting (called in the literature on communications“slanting”), which allows to skew
campaign message. (ii) Experimental evidence shows that political advertising is effective,
even if it contains no direct information (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1996). (iii) Under the
alternative assumption, campaign expenditures and the vote depend on prices of political
advertising. However, the increase in prices of television advertising (the largest item of
electoral campaign expenditures, Prat 1999), has no effect on total campaign spending lev-
els or vote margins in the US Congressional elections (Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder
2001).
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Tie-breaking assumptions
(T1) If the vote results in a tie, either interest group is pivotal with proba-
bility 1
2
.
(T2) An interest group has arbitrary weak preference for making: (i) truth-
ful endorsements; and (ii) donations to the candidate whom it would like to
elect.
(T3) When a voter has no preference between the candidates for office, he
votes for the incumbent.
4 The shared-information “thought experi-
ment”
First of all, we would like to understand how the vote by one interest group
depends on private information held by the other interest group. This section
describes voting behavior when the first-period returns from the projects are
public information. Hereafter, we call it informed vote. The reader who is
uninterested in the details of the analysis can move directly to summary at
the end of the section.
Voter objectives Being freed from re-election concerns, the winner of
the election picks efficient public policy at date 2. That is, she undertakes
project i if and only if she is valent with interest group i (recall inequalities (2)
and (3)). Hence, when a valent-type candidate wins the race, the expected
second-period payoff by interest group i is equal to11
B = vR+ (l + v) r − 1 > 0,
11Inequality (2) implies that B > 0.
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and its expected payoff from re-election is equal to12
I(ri, r−i) = B
(
Pr (vi = v | ri, r−i)−
1
2
)
+
+
1
2
(Pr (vi = v | ri, r−i)− Pr (v−i = v | ri, r−i)) . (4)
If I(ri, r−i)  0, interest group i votes for the incumbent. Otherwise, it votes
for the challenger. Notice that
Remark 1 (voter posterior beliefs and benefits from re-election)
I(ri, r−i) increases in Pr (vi = v | ri, r−i) at speed B +
1
2
, and decreases in
Pr (v−i = v | ri, r−i) at speed
1
2
.
Hence, a voter’s objectives are lexicographic: (i) it is most important for him
to elect a candidate who is congruent with his interest group; (ii) he would
also like to elect a candidate who is noncongruent with the other interest
group: ideally, a voter would like to elect a candidate who is biased towards
his interests.
The posterior beliefs about the incumbent’s type depend on correlation
between its two dimensions, and so does informed vote. We first describe
informed vote for two extreme values of correlation coefficient ρ: ρ = 0 and
ρ = 1. Then, we extend our description for other values of ρ by monotonicity
argument.
Informed vote with biased candidates When ρ = 0, a candidate is
biased. A successful outcome of project i signals that the incumbent is biased
towards interest group i. Hence, an interest group votes for the incumbent,
unless it receives a lower return from group-specific project than the other
interest group.
Lemma 1 (informed vote with biased candidates) Suppose that the
first-period returns from the projects are public information. When ρ = 0,
12The expected second-period payoff by interest group i is equal to (i)
B Pr (vi = v | ri, r−i) +
1
2
(Pr (vi = v | ri, r−i)− Pr (v−i = v | ri, r−i)) if the incumbent
stays in office; and to (ii) B
2
if the challenger wins the election.
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interest group i votes for the challenger either if (i) ri = 0 and r−i > 0; or
else if (ii) ri = r and r−i = R. Otherwise, it votes for the incumbent.
13
The left limit of Figure 1 depicts the vote described by Lemma 1: I(0, R),
I(0, r), and I(r,R) lie in the lower part of the Figure, while for any other
pair of the first-period returns from the projects I(ri, r−i) is nonnegative.
Informed vote with unbiased candidates When ρ = 1, a candidate
is unbiased. Therefore, both interest groups vote for the same candidate.
Indeed, they re-elect the incumbent, unless the posterior weight is skewed
towards the event that she is a non-valent type. This happens either when
(i) both projects fail; or else when (ii) one project fails, the other project has
moderate return, and the signal on the incumbent’s type generated by the
failure is stronger, that is,14
3l + 2v > 1. (5)
Lemma 2 (informed vote with unbiased candidates) Suppose that the
first-period returns from the projects are public information. When ρ = 1,
interest group i votes for the challenger if (i) r1 = r2 = 0; or else if (ii)
r1 + r2 = r and inequality (5) is fulfilled. Otherwise, interest group i votes
for the incumbent.
Figure 1 illustrates the case in which moderate return from a project
generates a stronger signal on the incumbent’s type than the failure of a
project. At the right limit of the Figure, I(ri, r−i) is positive, unless ri =
r−i = 0. That is, both interest groups vote for the incumbent, unless none
of them receives any benefits.
Informed vote To describe informed vote for the interior values of pa-
rameter ρ, we first show its monotonicity.
13Since a biased incumbent cannot deliver high return from both projects, I (R,R) is
not well-defined for ρ = 0. However, I (R,R) = B
2
> 0 for any ρ arbitrary close to 0.
14Moderate return from a project generates a weaker signal on the incumbent’s type than
the failure of a project if and only if Pr (vi = v | ri = r) −
1
2
< 1
2
− Pr (vi = v | ri = 0),
which is equivalent to inequality (5): for the posteriors, see section A.2.
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Lemma 3 (monotonicity of informed vote) (i) ∂
∂ρ
(I(ri, r−i)) > 0, if
ri < r−i, or else if ri = r−i = r; (ii)
∂
∂ρ
(I(ri, r−i)) < 0, if ri > r−i, or else
if ri = r−i = 0; (iii)
∂
∂ρ
(I(R,R)) = 0.
Notice, that for any pair of the first-period returns from the projects, the
distance between the expected payoffs from re-election by different interest
groups decreases in ρ (unless both projects have high return);15 and when ρ
is sufficiently close to 1, both payoffs have the same sign.16
To illustrate this point, suppose that project 1 fails, and project 2 has
high return. The outcome of the first project signals that the incumbent’s
type lies in the lower cells of Table 1. The outcome of the second project
signals that the incumbent’s type lies in the left cells of Table 1.
When ρ = 0, the incumbent’s type lies on the secondary diagonal of Table
1. Therefore, both signals tell that the incumbent is biased towards interest
group 2. Trivially, the expected payoff from re-election by interest group 1 is
negative, while that by interest group 2 is positive: notice, that at the left
limit of Figure 1 I(0, R) lies far below 0, while I(R, 0) lies far above 0.
However, as ρ increases, more prior weight is put on the event that the
incumbent’s type lies on the main diagonal of Table 1. Hence, the expected
payoff from re-election by interest group 1 increases in ρ, as depicted by
the thick curve on Figure 1; while that by interest group’s 2 decreases in
ρ. Recall now, that high return from a project generates a stronger signal
on the incumbent’s type than the failure of a project. Therefore, in region
15When both projects have high return, the distance between the expected benefits from
re-election by different interest groups is equal to 0 for any ρ: recall, that high return from
a project cannot be generated by pure luck.
16Lupia (1994) shows that preferences by better-informed voters can be useful infor-
mation for the vote by less informed voters by using survey data on voting behavior in
insurance reform initiatives of 1998 in California. He finds that “poorly informed voters
used their knowledge of insurance industry preferences to emulate the behavior of those
respondents who had relatively high level of factual knowledge.”
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where ρ lies at least as high as threshold
ρ0R =
(B + 1) (1− l)
2B(1− v − l) + 1− l
(6)
expected payoffs from re-election by both interest groups’ are nonnegative.
Using similar argument, we describe voter expected payoff from re-election
for the other pairs of the first-period returns from the projects. When project
1 fails, and project 2 has moderate return, the expected payoffs from re-
election by both interest groups have the same sign when ρ lies sufficiently
high. The sign depends on which of the two signals on the incumbent’s type
is stronger. Figure 1 depicts the case where moderate return from project
2 generates a stronger signal on the incumbent’s type than the failure of
project 1, that is, inequality (5) is met. Dashed curve on the figure depicts
the expected payoff from re-election by interest group 1. In region where ρ
lies at least as high as threshold
ρ0r =
(B + 1) (1 + l)
2B(1− v − l) + 1 + l
(7)
the expected payoffs from re-election by both interest groups are nonnegative.
Suppose instead, that the failure of project 1 generates a stronger signal on
the incumbent’s type than moderate return from project 2. In region where
ρ lies above threshold
ρr
0
=
(B + 1) (1 + l)
2B(v + 2l) + 1 + l
(8)
the expected payoffs from re-election by both interest groups are nonneg-
ative. Notice, that threshold ρ0R lies above both thresholds ρ
0
r and ρ
r
0
. The
reason is that high return from a project generates the strongest signal on
the incumbent’s type.
When project 1 has moderate return, and project 2 has high return, the
expected benefits from re-election by interest group 1 are negative for any ρ
that lies below threshold
ρrR =
l (B + 1)
(B + 1) (2l + v)− l − v
. (9)
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Figure 1: The expected payoff from re-election.
The reason is that it avoids re-electing a politician who is certainly valent
with the other interest group (recall remark 1).
For all other combinations of the first-period returns from the projects,
the expected payoffs from re-election by an interest group are positive if and
only if it holds a positive return from group-specific project.
Lemma 4 (informed vote) Suppose that the first-period returns from the
projects are public information. Consider ρ > 0. Interest group i votes for
the challenger when: (i) ri = r−i = 0; or (ii) ri = r, r−i = R, and ρ < ρ
r
R;
or (iii) ri = 0, r−i = R, and ρ < ρ
0
R; or (iv) ri = 0, r−i = r, and either
inequality (5) is fulfilled or ρ < ρ0r; or else (v) ri = r, r−i = 0, inequality (5)
is fulfilled, and ρ > ρr
0
. Otherwise, interest group i votes for the incumbent.
Summary We can partition interval (0, 1] of correlation coefficient ρ
in three regions, depending on informed vote. This partition is depicted on
Figure 1. In region where ρ lies below the lower threshold ρ0R, an interest
14
group votes for the incumbent unless: (i) it receives no return from group-
specific project; or (ii) it receives moderate return, while the other interest
group receives high return, and ρ lies below threshold ρrR.
In region where ρ lies between the lower threshold ρ0R and the upper
threshold min {ρ0r, ρ
r
0
},17 and the informed vote is coherent, unless one of the
projects has moderate return, while the other project fails. Then, however,
informed vote results in a tie: the interest group that holds moderate return
votes for the incumbent, while the interest group that holds no return votes
for the challenger.
In region where ρ lies at least as high as the upper threshold informed
vote is perfectly coherent. Indeed, when moderate return from a project
generates a stronger signal on the incumbent’s type than the failure of a
project, the upper threshold is equal to ρ0r (see Figure 1). For any ρ  ρ
0
r,
both interest groups vote for the incumbent unless she fails both projects.
When, instead, the failure of a project generates a stronger signal on the
incumbent’s type than moderate return from a project, the upper threshold
is equal to ρr
0
. For any ρ  ρr
0
, both interest groups vote for the challenger,
unless the incumbent delivers either high return from at least one project or
moderate returns from both projects.
5 Bandwagon effects of campaign advertising
In this section, we return to the basic framework in which an interest group’s
first-period benefit is its private information. For each of the three regions
of parameter ρ that are described in the previous section, we find campaign
advertising and the vote in a symmetric pure strategy perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of the game. We focus on informative equilibria, that is, on equilibria
in which the interest groups share all information that is relevant for the vote.
For concreteness, we consider the least-cost equilibrium in which an interest
group plays the least-cost campaign advertising strategy among equally in-
17If inequality (5) is fulfilled, then ρ0
R
< ρr
0
< 1 < ρ0
r
. Otherwise, ρ0
R
< ρ0
r
 1 < ρr
0
.
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formative ones.
Independent vote When the degree of congruence between the inter-
est groups lies below the lower threshold, an interest group’s private informa-
tion is not relevant for the other interest group’s vote (lemma 4). Trivially,
the interest groups do not contribute to electoral campaigns. Because en-
dorsements are meaningless, the interest groups are indifferent what to tell
about their first-period payoffs. By assumption (T2), they tell the truth.
Proposition 1 (independent vote) In region ρ < ρ0R there is the unique
symmetric, pure strategies, informative, least-cost perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium of the game in which cI(ri) = c
C(ri) = 0; e(ri) = ri for any ri; and the
vote is described by lemma 4.
Influential cheap-talk When the degree of congruence between the
interest groups lies at least as high as the upper threshold, informed vote
is perfectly coherent (lemma 4). In order to maximize the efficiency of the
vote, the interest groups truthfully tell to each other their first-period payoffs.
Obviously, this is the least-costly way of information sharing.
Proposition 2 (influential “cheap-talk”) In region ρ  min {ρ0r, ρ
r
0
} there
is the unique symmetric, pure strategies, informative, least-cost perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the game in which cI(ri) = c
C(ri) = 0; e(ri) = ri for any ri;
and the vote is described by lemma 4.
Persuading campaign contributions When the degree of congru-
ence between the interest groups lies between the lower- and the upper
thresholds, the voters whom the incumbent delivers a positive return from
their group-specific project are eager to re-elect her. However, the voters who
receive no return vote for the challenger, unless they are convinced that the
incumbent has delivered high return to the other voters. In order to avoid a
possible tie in the election, the voters who seek re-election would like to claim
16
that they have received high return from their group-specific project, even
if in reality they have received only moderate return. Therefore, the voters
who intend to vote for the challenger do not trust such claims, unless they
are supported by campaign contribution which is unreasonably expensive for
an interest group holding moderate return from group-specific project. The
smallest campaign contribution persuading them to vote for the incumbent
is equal to18
c =
1
2
Pr (r−i = 0 | ri = r) I (r, 0) =
=
v (B (1 + l − 2ρ (v + 2l)) + (1− ρ) (1 + l))
4 (v + 2l)
. (10)
In the least-cost equilibrium, an interest group makes this contribution
when it receives high return from group-specific project. Otherwise, it does
not contribute to campaign advertising. Campaign contributions, if made,
are donated to the incumbent.19 Endorsements play no role, hence, they are
truthful (both insights follow from assumption (T2)).
Proposition 3 (persuading campaign contributions) In region
ρ0R  ρ < min {ρ
0
r, ρ
r
0
} there is the unique symmetric, pure strategies, infor-
mative, least-cost perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game in which cI(R) =
c, cC(R) = 0, cC(ri) = cI(ri) = 0 for any ri < R; e(ri) = ri for any ri; and
the vote is described by lemma 4.
6 Campaign donations and electoral sorting
This section describes how campaign contributions affect electoral sorting,
and, as a consequence, the future public policy. Because contributions are
useless when ρ lies the extreme regions of its space (recall propositions 1 and
2), we focus on the region where ρ0R  ρ < min {ρ
0
r, ρ
r
0
}.
18We use standard Bayesian updating to find Pr (r−i = 0 | ri = r); and equations (4),
(16), and (14) to find I (r, 0).
19Naturally, when the incumbent receives campaign contributions, she spends on polit-
ical advertising at least sum c, because her primary objective is to win the election.
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By proposition 3, an interest group contributes to the incumbent’s elec-
toral campaign if and only if it receives high return from group-specific
project. When the incumbent receives campaign contributions, she is re-
elected. Naturally, the probability of the event that the incumbent delivers
high return from at least one project is higher when she is valent with at
least one of the interest groups. Therefore,
Corollary 1 (campaign contributions electoral sorting) campaign
contributions increase the probability of re-election, unless the incumbent is
a nonvalent-type.
Notice, that campaign contributions skew electoral outcomes. Firstly,
they disproportionately benefit the incumbent.20 This insight comports nicely
with tighter limits to contributions for state elections observed to lead to
closer elections for incumbent candidates (Aparicio-Castillo and Strattman
2005).21 Secondly, campaign contributions by an interest group enhance
electoral fortunes by a candidate who is valent with this group. Consequently,
they increase the probability of the event that this group benefits from a
favorable public policy in the future.
Notice, furthermore, that campaign contributions lie below donor ex-
pected benefits from re-election:
c <
1
2
Pr (r−i = 0 | ri = R) I (R, 0) =
=
1
4
(B (1− l − 2ρv)− (1− ρ) (1− l)) . (11)
At the same time, they generate informational benefit to all voters. There-
fore,
20The reason is that the voters holding the most precise private information seek re-
election. If instead we assume that the most informed voters would like to avoid re-election,
it is the challenger who benefits from campaign contributions. Hence, the general insight
is that the candidate preferred by an interest group whose private information is the most
precise receives the highest contributions and wins office.
21Since 1970’s, most of the US states have tightened their campaign finance laws. In
their paper, Aparicio-Castillo and Strattman take an advantage of substantial variation
in limits to contributions for state elections, both across states, and in time.
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Corollary 2 (campaign contributions and voter welfare) campaign
contributions have a positive welfare value.
Hence, caps on campaign contributions disproportionately decrease the effi-
ciency of electoral sorting.22 Notice moreover, that they encourage the voters
to seek other, maybe even costlier ways to share information about the can-
didates for office.
Certainly, insight of corollary 2 should be taken with a grain of salt, be-
cause in our model campaign financing is a pure sorting procedure.23 Instead,
Prat and Snyder (2006) find that campaign contributions signal effectiveness
of a candidate to the voters if and only if they: (i) lie below a given threshold;
and (ii) come from organizations, rather than from individuals or parties.
Such contributions constitute most-, but not all electoral fundraising (see
summary statistics in Table 1 of their paper).
7 Conclusion
This paper builds a model of political campaign contributions in which the
interest groups hold asymmetric information about candidates competing for
office. The paper’s new feature is that, while the interest groups have con-
flicting objectives regarding targeted spending, they are congruent through
their desire to elect a high-valence politician. The paper accordingly analyzes
endorsements and campaign contributions as alternative means to induce an
electoral bandwagon. Campaign contributions are evidently a costlier, and
therefore stronger signal than endorsements. That is why, campaign contri-
22Caps on campaign contributions are the most important component of the US federal
campaign finance regulation since the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: amend-
ments of 1974 limited campaign advertising expenditures, but these limits where with-
drawn by Supreme Court in 1976; later amendments of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
2002 only restricted “soft money” contributions and, at the same time, pushed up the
limits to “hard money” contributions from political parties.
23This insight may change if we assume, for example, that at some costs, the incumbent
can exert an effort to avoid the failure of a project with a higher probability. Then,
exchange of information between the interest groups may weaken her incentives to exert
an effort on additional project: this consideration is reminiscent of Holmström (1999).
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butions are used when the congruence between interest groups is weaker.
Notice, that we rationalize campaign contributions without negative con-
sequences or empirically unsupported assumptions regarding the role of money
in campaigning. Furthermore, our model gives a possible reason why cam-
paign contributions disproportionately benefit incumbent candidates. We
hope that future research will analyze the complementarity of this and al-
ternative approaches in providing a better picture of political endorsements
and contributions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Posterior beliefs about the incumbent’s type
This section describes the posterior beliefs about the incumbent’s type. If
project i has high return, the constituencies learn that the incumbent is
valent with interest group i, regardless of return from project −i. That is,
Pr (vi = v | ri = R) = 1 for any r−i. (12)
Otherwise, some uncertainty is left about the incumbent’s valence with in-
terest group i. Suppose, for example, that both projects fail. Then,
Pr (vi = v | ri = r−i = 0) =
=
Pr (ri = 0, r−i = 0 | vi = v)
Pr (ri = 0, r−i = 0 | vi = v) + Pr (ri = 0, r−i = 0 | vi = 0)
,
By total probability theorem, we find
Pr (ri = r−i = 0 | vi = v) =
ρ
2
(1− l − 2v)2+
+
1− ρ
2
(1− l − 2v) (1− l) =
1
2
(1− l − 2v) (1− l − 2ρv) , and
Pr (ri = r−i = 0 | vi = 0) =
ρ
2
(
(1− l − 2v)2 + (1− l)2
)
+
+(1− ρ) (1− l − 2v) (1− l) =
1
2
(1− l) (1− l − 2 (1− ρ) v) .
Hence,
Pr (vi = v | ri = r−i = 0) =
(1− l − 2v) (1− l − 2ρv)
2 ((1− l) (1− l − 2v) + 2ρv2)
, (13)
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In a similar way, we find that
Pr (vi = v | ri = 0, r−i = r) =
(1− l − 2v) (l + ρv)
l (1− l − 2v) + (l + v) (1− l)− 2ρv2
, (14)
Pr (vi = v | ri = 0, r−i = R) =
ρ (1− l − 2v)
1− l − 2ρv
, (15)
Pr (vi = v | ri = r, r−i = 0) =
(l + v) (1− l − 2ρv)
l (1− l − 2v) + (l + v) (1− l)− 2ρv2
, (16)
Pr (vi = v | ri = r−i = r) =
(l + v) (l + ρv)
2l (l + v) + ρv2
, and (17)
Pr (vi = v | ri = r, r−i = R) =
ρ (l + v)
l + ρv
. (18)
Notice, that
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri = R, r−i))
∂ρ
= 0 for any r−i, and
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri, r−i = 0))
∂ρ
< 0 <
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri, r−i = r))
∂ρ
<
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri, r−i = R))
∂ρ
for any ri < R.
Indeed, by deriving equations (12)-(18) with respect to ρ, and using inequal-
ity (1) when applicable, we find
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri = R))
∂ρ
= 0, (19)
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri = r−i = 0))
∂ρ
=
= −
v (1− l) (1− l − v) (1− l − 2v)
((1− l) (1− l − 2v) + 2ρv2)2
< 0, (20)
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri = 0, r−i = r))
∂ρ
=
=
v (1− l) (2l + v) (1− l − 2v)
(l (1− l − 2v) + (l + v) (1− l)− 2ρv2)2
> 0, (21)
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∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri = 0, r−i = R))
∂ρ
=
(1− l) (1− l − 2v)
(1− l − 2ρv)2
> 0, (22)
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri = r, r−i = 0))
∂ρ
=
=
−4vl (l + v) (1− l − v)
(l (1− l − 2v) + (l + v) (1− l)− 2ρv2)2
< 0, (23)
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri = r−i = r))
∂ρ
=
vl (l + v) (2l + v)
(2l (l + v) + ρv2)2
> 0, (24)
∂ (Pr (vi = v | ri = r, r−i = R))
∂ρ
=
l (l + v)
(l + ρv)2
> 0. (25)
A.2 Proof of lemma 1
Suppose that ρ = 0. Then, by equation (4):
I (0, R) < I (0, r) < I (0, 0) = 0 (see equations (13)-(15));
I (r, r) = 0 (see equation (17));
I (R, 0) = I (R, r) =
B + 1
2
> 0 (see equations (12), (18), and (15));
I (r,R) = −
B + 1
2
< 0 (see equations (12), (18)).
Outcome ri = r−i = R is impossible. However,
I (R,R) =
B
2
> 0 for any ρ > 0.
A.3 Proof of lemma 2
Suppose that ρ = 1. We prove lemma 2 in three steps. On the first step, we
prove that
I (ri, r−i) > 0, if ri + r−i  min {R, 2r} (26)
Indeed,
Pr (vi = v | ri = R, r−i) = 1 for any r−i, and
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Pr (vi = v | ri, r−i = R) = 1 for any ri
(see equations (12), (18), and (15)). Hence, according to equation (4),
I (ri, R) = I (R, r−i) =
B
2
> 0 for any r1, r2.
Furthermore, according to equation (17),
Pr (vi = v | ri = r−i = r) =
(l + v)2
(l + v)2 + l2
>
1
2
.
Therefore,
I (r, r) =
B (v2 + 2lv)
2
(
(l + v)2 + l2
) > 0.
On the second step, we use equation (13) which implies
Pr (vi = v | ri = 0, r−i = 0) =
(1− l − 2v)2
2 ((1− l) (1− l − 2v) + 2v2)
<
1
2
to see that
I (0, 0) = −
Bv (1− l − v)
((1− l) (1− l − 2v) + 2v2)
< 0. (27)
On the third step we show that
I (0, r) = I (r, 0)  0, unless inequality (5) is satisfied. (28)
Indeed, by equations (14) and (16),
Pr (vi = v | ri = r, r−i = 0) = Pr (vi = v | ri = 0, r−i = r) =
=
(l + v) (1− l − 2v)
l (1− l − 2v) + (l + v) (1− l)− 2v2
<
1
2
if and only if
inequality (5) is fulfilled. Hence,
I (r, 0) = I (0, r) =
Bv (1− 3l − 2v)
2 (l (1− l − 2v) + (l + v) (1− l)− 2v2)
< 0
if and only if inequality (5) is fulfilled.
Inequalities (26), (27), and (28) prove lemma 2.
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A.4 Proof of lemma 3
To prove lemma 3, we use equations (4), and (19)-(25). We find:
∂
∂ρ
(I (R,R)) = 0;
∂
∂ρ
(I (0, R)) = −
(1− l) (1− l − 2v)
2 (1− l − 2ρv)2
< 0;
∂
∂ρ
(I (R, r)) = −
l (l + v)
2 (l + ρv)2
< 0;
∂
∂ρ
(I (r, r)) =
Bvl (l + v) (2l + v)
(2l (l + v) + ρv2)2
> 0;
∂
∂ρ
(I (r, R)) =
(2B + 1) l (l + v)
2 (l + ρv)2
> 0;
∂
∂ρ
(I (r, 0)) =
= −
v (8Bl (l + v) (1− l − v) + (1− 3l − 2v) (2l + v − 3lv − 2l2))
2 (l (1− l − 2v) + (l + v) (1− l)− 2ρv2)2
< 0;
∂
∂ρ
(I (0, 0)) = −
Bv (1− l) (1− l − v) (1− l − 2v)
2 ((1− l) (1− l − 2v) + 2ρv2)2
< 0;
∂
∂ρ
(I (0, r)) =
=
v (2B (1− l) (v + 2l) (1− l − 2v) + (1− 3l − 2v) (2l + v − 3lv − 2l2))
2 (l (1− l − 2v) + (l + v) (1− l)− 2ρv2)2
> 0;
(29)
∂
∂ρ
(I (0, R)) =
(2B + 1) (1− l) (1− l − 2v)
2 (1− l − 2vρ)2
> 0. (30)
A.5 Proof of lemma 4
By lemmas 1 and 2, I (0, 0) < 0, I (r, r) > 0, and I (R, r−i) > 0 regardless
of r−i, both when ρ = 0 and when ρ = 1. Hence, lemma 3 implies that
I (0, 0) < 0, I (r, r) > 0, and I (R, r−i) > 0 regardless of r−i for any ρ > 0.
Instead, I (r, R) and I (0, R) have different signs when ρ = 0 and when
ρ = 1. Therefore, by monotonicity, I (r, R)  0 if and only if ρ  ρrR, where
threshold ρrR solves equation I (r, R) = 0; and I (0, R)  0 if and only if
ρ  ρ0R, where threshold ρ
0
R solves equation I (0, R) = 0.
When inequality (5) is violated, I (r, 0) has the same sign when ρ = 0
as when ρ = 1, unlike I (0, r). Hence, I (r, 0)  0, while I (0, r)  0 if and
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only if ρ  ρ0r, where threshold ρ
0
r solves equation I (0, r) = 0. When instead
inequality (5) is fulfilled, I (0, r) has the same sign when ρ = 0 as when ρ = 1,
unlike I (r, 0). Hence, I (0, r) < 0, while I (r, 0)  0 if and only if ρ  ρr
0
,
where threshold ρr
0
solves equation I (r, 0) = 0.
Notice that,
ρrR < ρ
0
R < min
{
ρ0r, ρ
r
0
}
.
Indeed, inequality ρrR < ρ
0
R is equivalent to 1 + l > 0. Furthermore,
ρ0r − ρ
0
R =
4B (B + 1) l (1− l − v)
(2B(1− v − l) + 1− l) (2B(1− v − l) + 1 + l)
> 0,
ρr
0
− ρ0R =
2B (B + 1)
(
(1− l)2 − 2v
)
(2B(1− v − l) + 1− l) (2B(v + 2l) + 1 + l)
> 0.
A.6 Proof of proposition 1
Suppose that ρ < ρ0R. When the vote is partisan, as described by lemma
4, (i) individual rationality requires cI(ri) = c
C(ri) = 0 for any ri; (ii) an
interest group is indifferent among endorsements, hence, e(ri) = ri for any ri
(recall, that an interest group has arbitrary weak preference for truthtelling).
Trivially, such campaign advertising is consistent with partisan vote.
A.7 Proof of proposition 2
Consider region ρ  min {ρ0r, ρ
r
0
}. For concreteness, let inequality (5) be
violated, so that min {ρ0r, ρ
r
0
} = ρ0r. When the vote is coherent, as described
by lemma 4, endorsements are truthful. Indeed, suppose that ri = 0. By
lying e(0) > 0, interest group i reduces its expected second-period payoff by
−
1
2
Pr (r−i = 0 | ri = 0) I (0, 0) > 0.
Hence e(0) = 0. Suppose that ri > 0. By reporting e(ri) > 0 rather than
e(ri) = 0 interest group i increases its expected second-period payoff by
1
2
Pr (r−i = 0 | ri) I (ri, 0) > 0.
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Endorsements e(ri) = r and e(ri) = R deliver the same expected second-
period payoff to interest group i. Hence, e(ri) = ri (recall, that interest
group i has arbitrary weak preference for truthtelling).
When endorsements make the first period returns public, the vote is co-
herent (lemma 4). Hence, these endorsements and the vote constitute a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. Trivially, this equilibrium is infor-
mative and the least-cost.
A.8 Proof of proposition 3
Consider region ρ0R  ρ < min {ρ
0
r, ρ
r
0
}. By lemma 4, campaign advertising
is
(i) informative if and only if
either e(ri) = e(R), or cI(ri) = cI(R), or else cC(ri) = cC(R) for any ri < R;
(31)
(ii) individually rational if and only if24
cI(ri) = cC(ri) = 0 for any ri < R, and (32)
cI(R) + cC(R) 
1
2
Pr (r−i = 0 | ri = R) I (R, 0) =
=
1
4
(B (1− l − 2ρv)− (1− ρ) (1− l)) ; and (33)
(iii) incentive compatible with informed vote if and only if
cI(R) + cC(R) > c. (34)
Indeed, when inequality (34) is met, an interest group holding moderate
return from group-specific project does not signal that it holds high return.
Trivially, the nonbeneficiaries do not send such a signal either:
1
2
Pr (r−i = 0 | ri = 0) I (0, 0)  0 < c.
24We use standard Bayesian updating to find Pr (r−i = 0 | ri = R), and equations (4),
(12), and (15) to find I (R, 0).
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At the same time, an interest group holding high return is eager to signal
information about its return if this signalling satisfies individual rationality
constraint (33).
The vote such that the beneficiaries vote for the incumbent, while the non-
beneficiaries vote for the challenger, unless e(ri) = e(R), or c
I(ri) = c
I(R),
or else cC(ri) = c
C(R) for some i, and campaign advertising satisfying con-
straints (32), (33), (34) constitute an informative pure strategies equilibrium
of the game. In the least-cost equilibrium campaign contributions are just
enough to satisfy the incentive constraint (34), that is, they are arbitrary
close to c. The challenger receives no contributions, because the beneficiaries
have arbitrary weak preference to contribute to the incumbent’s electoral
campaign. Endorsements are truthful, because they play no role, and the
interest groups attach arbitrary small value to truthtelling.
A.9 Proof of corollary 1
We compare electoral sorting in two extreme regimes: when campaign con-
tributions are unlimited, and when they are prohibited. We denote (i) the
indicator of campaign finance regulation by
λ =
{
1, when campaign contributions are prohibited;
0, when campaign contributions are unlimited,
(ii) the probability to re-elect a valent-type incumbent by zV (λ); (iii) the
probability to re-elect a biased-type incumbent by zB (λ); and (iv) the prob-
ability to re-elect nonvalent-type incumbent by zN (λ).
When campaign contributions are prohibited, the vote is partisan. There-
fore,
zV (1) = l + 2v, zB (1) = l + v, zN (1) = l. (35)
By proposition 3, when campaign contributions are unlimited, the incumbent
stays in office with probability (i) 1, either if at least one project has high
return, or else if both projects have moderate return; (ii) 1
2
, if one project
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has moderate return, and the other project fails; (iii) 0, if both projects fail.
Hence,
zV (0) = l + 2v + v (1− 2v − l) , zB (0) = l + v +
v
2
(1− 2v − l) , zN (0) = l.
(36)
Equations (35) and (36) imply:
zV (0)− zV (1) = v (1− 2v − l) > 0, (37)
zB (0)− zB (1) =
v
2
(1− 2v − l) > 0, (38)
zN (0)− zN (1) = 0. (39)
A.10 Proof of corollary 2
If the challenger wins the electoral race, the expected second-period welfare
(measured as a sum of the second-period interest groups’ expected payoffs)
is equal to B. If, instead, the incumbent stays in office, it is equal to 2B,
if she is a valent-type, to 0, if she is a nonvalent-type, and to B if she is a
biased-type. Hence, the expected second-period welfare is equal to25
W2 (λ) = B
(
1 +
ρ
2
(zV (λ)− zN (λ))
)
. (40)
As in the above proof of remark 2, we consider two extreme regimes: when
campaign contributions are unlimited, and when they are prohibited. Equa-
tions (35) and (36) imply that voter benefit from campaign contributions is
equal to
W2 (1)−W2 (0) =
1
2
Bρv (1− l − 2v) . (41)
At date 1, the expected electoral campaign fundraising is equal to
c (Pr (r1 = R, r2 = R) + Pr (r1 = R, r2 = R)) + 2cPr (r1 = R, r2 = R) =
25Hence, the vote is more efficient the higher the probability to re-elect a valent-type
incumbent, and the lower the probability to re-elect a nonvalent-type incumbent. The effi-
ciency of the vote does not depend on the probability to re-elect a biased-type incumbent,
because the distribution of parameter vi is fully diffused.
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= 2c (Pr (r1 = R, r2 = R) + Pr (r1 = R, r2 = R)) = 2cPr (r1 = R) = cv.
(42)
It is straightforward to see that
cv <
1
2
Bρv (1− l − 2v) . (43)
Indeed, by equation (10), inequality (43) is equivalent to
(B + 1− ρ) (1 + l) v < 2ρB (v + 2l) (1− l − v) . (44)
The left-hand side of inequality (44) decreases in ρ, while its right-hand side
increases in ρ. Hence, it suffices to verify that inequality (44) is fulfilled at
the lower threshold, that is,(
B + 1
ρ0R
− 1
)
(1 + l) v < 2B (v + 2l) (1− l − v) , (45)
where ρ0R is given by equation (6). It is straightforward to verify that in-
equality (45) is equivalent to inequality
1− l − v > 0,
which follows from inequality (1).
Inequality (43) tells that welfare benefit that is given by equation (41)
lies above average political advertising expenditures that are not higher than
cv.
A.11 Re-election concerns and political activeness
This section proves that there exists Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the
game in which at date 1.b the incumbent undertakes both projects regardless
of her type.
Consider the following date 1.c beliefs: (i) at date 1.b the incumbent
undertakes both projects regardless of her type; (ii) if she shuts down project
i, then she is not valent with interest group i. At date 1.b, the incumbent
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maximizes the probability of re-election. If she anticipates that the vote is
such as described by lemma 4, she undertakes both projects regardless of her
type, which is consistent with the above beliefs. We prove this statement for
ρ = 0.26 If the incumbent shuts down both projects, she is out of office at
date 2. If she undertakes only one project, she is re-elected with probability
1
2
: the interest group whose group-specific project is undertaken votes for her,
while the other interest group votes against her. If the incumbent undertakes
both projects, there is at least one interest group that votes for her. She is
re-elected with probability 1
2
(1 + l (l + v) + (1− l) (1− l − 2v)).
26It is straightforward to verify that for any ρ > 0, the incumbent’s incentives to under-
take both projects at date 1.b. are at least as strong as for ρ = 0.
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